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ABSTRACT
String obfuscation is an established technique used by proprietary,
closed-source applications to protect intellectual property. Further-
more, it is also frequently used to hide spyware or malware in appli-
cations. In both cases, the techniques range from bit-manipulation
over XOR operations to AES encryption. However, string obfus-
cation techniques/tools suffer from one shared weakness: They
generally have to embed the necessary logic to deobfuscate strings
into the app code.
In this paper, we show that most of the string obfuscation tech-
niques found in malicious and benign applications for Android can
easily be broken in an automated fashion.We developed StringHound,
an open-source tool that uses novel techniques that identify obfus-
cated strings and reconstruct the originals using slicing.
We evaluated StringHound on both benign and malicious An-
droid apps. In summary, we deobfuscate almost 30 times more ob-
fuscated strings than other string deobfuscation tools. Additionally,
we analyzed 100,000 Google Play Store apps and found multiple ob-
fuscated strings that hide vulnerable cryptographic usages, insecure
internet accesses, API keys, hard-coded passwords, and exploitation
of privileges without the awareness of the developer. Furthermore,
our analysis reveals that not only malware uses string obfuscation
but also benign apps make extensive use of string obfuscation.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Privacy protections;Mobile platform
security; Software security engineering.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Obfuscation protects applications against abusive practices (e.g.,
repackaging) but also hides malicious intent (e.g., malware) [17, 38].
It significantly impedes the analysis of apps to check their com-
pliance with privacy regulations or to inspect them for detecting
malware [37, 46]. In particular, string obfuscation, which is applied
by most existing obfuscators [12, 16, 41, 52, 62], can hide paths,
URLs, and intents to track user activities, thus compromising the
user’s privacy, or opening shells for remote command execution to
execute a malicious payload.
Opposing prior work [17, 38, 56], which have stated that strings
are often not obfuscated in the wild, in this paper, we provide
strong empirical evidence (cf. Section 4.2.1) that it is widely used
in both malicious and benign apps. The usage of string obfuscation
in the benign apps is to a significant extent due to integrated ad
libraries – hence, even the app developer may not be aware of
their presence. Under these conditions, approaches that analyze
plain strings [21, 35, 40, 42, 60, 63, 65] are deemed to be ineffective,
and techniques for automatically uncovering obfuscated strings are
highly needed.
Given that the deobfuscation logic usually is part of the applica-
tion [58], an analyst can try to debug or to run the application with
a monkey script. However, such "brute-force" testing has serious
drawbacks. First, given that there is no guarantee that all execu-
tion paths are covered and that the appropriate execution point to
deobfuscate a string is unknown, the latter maybe not triggered.
Second, obfuscated applications could detect the debugging mode
and avoid to execute the deobfuscation [46] since deobfuscation
functionality is often protected by guards trying to defend against
artificial runtime environments [54].
Several dedicated approaches [5, 14, 15, 26, 46, 49, 61, 64] have
been proposed to address obfuscation. But, they suffer from limited
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scalability and generality. Many of the existing approaches [5, 46,
61] typically alter if statements of the target program and then run
the code with all combinations of values to circumvent defenses and
force the execution of all branches. Given that many obfuscators
perform automatic string obfuscation on millions of apps, the above
approaches are not suited for large-scale analyses. The approach by
Zhou et al. [64] slightly reduces the number of executions, but at the
cost of generality, as its emulator is fitted to string operations only.
In fact, to the best of our knowledge, all works lack a systematic
analysis of existing automatic obfuscators and their scope.
To address the above problems of state-of-the-art deobfuscators,
we propose StringHound, a novel string deobfuscation technique
for automatically obfuscated strings in Java bytecode. StringHound
generalizes to different string obfuscations and executes only the
code necessary for their deobfuscation to ensure scalability.
Additionally, we performed a comprehensive study of existing
obfuscation techniques and used the gained insights to guide the
design of StringHound to ensure generality. Therefore, we systemat-
ically studied how strings are obfuscated in ad libraries (cf. Section
2). These libraries often employ string obfuscation [10, 13, 47, 50, 51]
and are, hence, a good source for systematically surveying string
obfuscation techniques used in the wild. To ensure that only code
necessary for deobfuscation is executed, StringHound (a) locates
the usage of obfuscated strings within the application code, (b)
extracts the deobfuscation logic alongside with all the context it
needs to perform, and (c) executes the extracted code directly on
a Java Virtual Machine (JVM) to yield the plain-text versions of
obfuscated strings.
For a fast location, we propose two classifiers, one that uses
decision trees [45] to identify potentially obfuscated strings, and
another one that uses Spearman correlation [39] to identify code of
deobfuscation methods. Given that the deobfuscation logic usually
is part of the application [58], we propose a specifically targeted
slicing technique that includes all program statements which affect
the state of an obfuscated string sink located within a given method.
Additionally, StringHound extracts the execution context of the de-
obfuscation logic and injects the slice into it. Through the injection
of the slice, countermeasures, potentially introduced by obfusca-
tors, are rendered ineffective. Finally, StringHound executes the
resulting slice within the extracted context to obtain deobfuscated
strings.
We evaluated StringHound and four state-of-the-art deobfusca-
tion tools [14, 15, 26, 49] by applying them to a set of apps that we
obfuscated with 21 different techniques. The evaluation shows that
StringHound yields significantly better results than other tools. We
also applied StringHound to four sets of benign and malicious real-
world apps: (a) a random sample of 100,000 apps, (b) popular apps
based on AndroidRank Top 500 [2], (c) malware from Contagio [9],
and (d) apps from the Google Play Store in 2018 classified as mali-
cious by VirusTotal. StringHound’s classifiers were key to enabling
a study of more than 100,000 apps by using them to filter out apps
that do not contain any obfuscated strings to avoid unnecessary
slicing and deobfuscation steps. A brute-force approach that tries
to deobfuscate each string in all apps would be infeasible, given
that an app such as, WhatsApp [59] contain 17,176 strings.
Our study shows that string obfuscation is used at least 12 times
more often than previous studies stated [17, 38, 56]. We categorize
our findings and give insights on how string-obfuscation is used in
different kinds of apps. Besides expected results, e.g., obfuscated
URLs and commands in malware sets, we surprisingly found that
76% of the 100,000 apps contain obfuscated strings. An in-depth anal-
ysis revealed that several strings are commonly found in ad libraries
integrated into apps. Moreover, we identified two apps in the Top
500 set that conceal suspicious behavior through string obfuscation.
They collect sensitive information from a user’s mobile phone, such
as call logs and location information, to build a user profile for track-
ing. Furthermore, they also check for the SuperUser.apk, which
grants root access to the mobile phone. These apps are installed over
20 million times and are not flagged as malicious by VirusTotal [55].
In summary, this work makes the following contributions:
(1) A study which identified 21 unique string obfuscation tech-
niques used by state-of-the-art obfuscators (Section 2).
(2) Two novel techniques for locating string obfuscation (Sec-
tion 3.1.2 & 3.1.3).
(3) StringHound1, an novel open-source string deobfuscator
that integrates the proposed classifier and slicing techniques.
It yields significantly better results than other deobfusca-
tors on our evaluation data set and renders intra-procedural
obfuscation techniques ineffective.
(4) A study of string obfuscation in four real-world data sets
(Section 4.2.2) containing more than 100,000 apps and pro-
viding valuable insights into the prevalence of obfuscation
usage in the wild.
2 EXISTING STRING OBFUSCATION
TECHNIQUES
We systematically analyzed string obfuscation in ad libraries, since
these libraries have been shown to use it in various forms and
quantities [10, 13, 47, 50, 51] The knowledge gained from the fol-
lowing analysis was used as a basis for designing our approach and
conducting controlled experiments for evaluation purposes.
Methodology. As there is no publicly available set of ad libraries
that use string obfuscation, we sampled our own collection of ad
libraries by analyzing apps which integrate them. First, we collected
a list of package names of frequently used ad libraries [30] and a
list of URLs of ad networks [3]. We reversed the internet domain
name [11] (e.g., youmi.net ⇒ net.youmi) of the URLs to guess
package names of ad libraries. Next, we searched for code with
the respective package names by analyzing 100,000 randomly sam-
pled apps from AndroZoo [25] and found 640 unique ad libraries
distributed across 81,008 individual apps.
To identify string obfuscation techniques, wemanually inspected
obfuscated strings and analyzed their flows until they reached meth-
ods that are notmodifiable by the obfuscator (e.g., System.println).
Nevertheless, we did not focus only on string constants because, in
the obfuscated form, they are often also stored in byte arrays [48].
Hence, we considered any data structure which can be used to
hide string representations and refer to such data structures in the
following as obfuscated strings.
1https://github.com/stg-tud/StringHound
Table 1: String Obfuscation Techniques in Ad Libraries
Example Package Cipher Encoding Countermeasure Count
com.chamspire B64 9
com.intentsoftware B85 3
com.ironsource custom 16
com.youmi custom 6
com.adcolony URL 6
a.a.a AES SO 3
com.google.android AES & Bit B64 SI 22
cn.pro.sdk Bit BA 13
br.com.tempest Bit SW mod. key 3
com.applovin Bit Key in BA 25
br.com.tempest Bit Key is SC (KSC) 3
com.tnkfactory Bit OI 9
br.com.tempest Bit SC 3
com.google.android Bit ST 9
br.com.tempest Bit SW 3
com.apptracker Bit TK 9
com.adlib Bit TM 13
com.mnt Bit B64 Key is idx of BA 9
com.waystorm.ads Bit B64 KMC 31
com.vpon.adon DESede 28
com.mt.airad DESede B64 25
During our analysis, we classified a string as not obfuscated, if
it flows, without any modification, into an unmodifiable method 2.
Additionally, if the string contains multiple words found in a dic-
tionary or matches a known format (e.g., XML), it is not classified
as obfuscated. In the case of other data structures, we considered
all bit operations that are performed on constant values to be an
indication for string obfuscation. For each obfuscated string, we
then manually analyzed the code that deobfuscates the string to
determine the used technique.
Overview of identified techniques. Using our methodology, we
identified 21 unique string obfuscation techniques found in 236 ad
libraries shown in Table 1. Among the identified techniques are also
those used by the state-of-the-art obfuscation tool manufacturers
such as, DexGuard 5.5.41 [16], Allatori 6.8 [41], DashO 9.2 [12],
Stringer 3.0.5 [52], ZKM 12.0 [62], and Shield4J [8]. For each tech-
nique, we show the cipher, the encoding, and countermeasures
used to make detection by static/dynamic analyses more difficult.
Additionally, we list the distribution (Count) of each string obfus-
cation technique across all 236 ad libraries (incl. duplicates). The
used ciphers are bit manipulations such as XOR operations (Bit),
DESede, AES, and the combination of bit manipulation and AES.
The encodings consist of Base64 (B64), URLEncoder (URL), Base85
(B85), or custom encodings (custom), e.g., using a BigInteger with
base 33, or splitting a string and concatenating the characters at
the beginning and the end of the new string. We identified the
following countermeasures:
Serialized Object (SO): One technique loads a serialized object at
runtime that implements a deobfuscation method. Subsequently,
it must be called through reflection to deobfuscate a string. This
technique evades deobfuscators that rely exclusively on identifying
and executing deobfuscation methods.
2Most obfuscators produce strings with unreadable symbols and, therefore, contain
no words.
Static Initializer (SI): The static initializer computes the deobfus-
cation key. This practice evades deobfuscators who extract the logic
of only one particular method for execution.
Byte Arrays (BA): Two of the analyzed techniques use byte arrays
to hide the representation of obfuscated strings and, thus, evade
deobfuscators that rely on this representation.
Switch Statements (SW): Two techniques use a switch statement
in a loop to deobfuscate a different string in each loop iteration. Both
store the resulting strings in an array, and each method accesses
this array. These techniques evade deobfuscators that search for an
explicit deobfuscation method.
Stack Calls (SC): Two techniques hard-code the calling context
(e.g., method name and class name) of the deobfuscation method.
While one technique checks the calling context in a conditional
statement, the second one uses the calling-context information as
part of the deobfuscation key. Both techniques evade deobfuscators
that execute the deobfuscation logic without a specific context.
However, only the second one enforces the extraction of the context
for slicing approaches because it is a direct part of the deobfuscation.
Object Initializer (OI): One technique deobfuscates strings by
inserting a specific class whose constructor initializes the deob-
fuscation key. Subsequently, a method of the constructed object
deobfuscates all strings which were obfuscated with the initialized
key. This technique evades deobfuscators that execute only static
methods.
Stream Transfer (ST): Hidden channels are used to transfer obfus-
cated strings to deobfuscationmethods. For instance, one obfuscator
transfers the obfuscated string via input/output streams to its deob-
fuscation method. This technique evades deobfuscators that track
obfuscated strings and would, therefore, miss data flows arising
from streams.
Two Keys (TK): Two different keys are used for string deobfusca-
tion. This usage evades deobfuscators that try brute force guessing
of one key to uncover obfuscated strings.
Two Methods (TM): Two methods are used for string deobfusca-
tion. This usage evades deobfuscators that execute only one deob-
fuscation method to uncover obfuscated strings.
Key Management Calls (KMC): One technique initializes deobfus-
cation keys directly before their usage by using object fields. This
technique hinders deobfuscators that do not handle the initializa-
tion of fields.
As depicted in Table 1, different combinations of ciphers, en-
codings, and countermeasures are used as techniques for string
obfuscation. We refer to these combinations as obfuscation schemes.
Some of the techniques are used in state-of-the-art commercial ob-
fuscation tools, and developers most commonly use these tools to
obfuscate strings in Android and Java apps. The findings of this
study are surprising as none of the identified techniques requires a
broader focus than the one described above.
Observation 1. All analyzed obfuscation schemes are ini-
tialized within the class containing the deobfuscation methods.
Thus, no heavyweight inter-procedural analysis seems necessary
for our data set.
Next, the gained knowledge of these identified schemes is used
to evaluate our approach. Therefore, we obfuscated samples with
all schemes by using either an acquired tool or a re-implemented
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Figure 1: Overview of StringHound’s Approach
version of the scheme. The re-implementation was achieved by
manually reversing the deobfuscation logic found in obfuscated
apps. For instance, if the deobfuscation logic used a Base64 decoding
followed by an AES decryption, we first encrypted all strings with
AES and then encoded the result using Base64.
3 THE STRINGHOUND APPROACH
StringHound processes Java bytecode in five steps. Figure 1 shows a
high-level view of this process. First, when we analyze an Android
Package (APK), we transform its Dalvik bytecode to Java bytecode
and process the result with our analysis. Second, to reveal obfus-
cated strings, we need to identify the methods that potentially use
them. For locating usages of obfuscated strings, we propose two
complementary techniques: a classifier for identifying potentially
obfuscated strings (String Classifier), and a classifier for identifying
deobfuscation methods (Method Classifier). The string classifier
operates on characteristics of obfuscated strings by using decision
trees. The method classifier matches distributions of instructions
from known deobfuscation methods with the Spearman correlation.
Third, we find the starting point for the slicing (slicing criterion) in
the methods that contain the usage of the obfuscated strings. Forth,
we use a specifically targeted slicing technique that computes all
program statements that affect the state of a given slicing criterion.
Finally, StringHound injects the slice into the execution context of
the deobfuscation logic. Afterward, it executes the resulting slice
to obtain deobfuscated strings. The injection of the slice into the
context renders countermeasures introduced by obfuscators inef-
fective. Our detailed description of StringHound shows the design
decisions taken to address the obfuscation schemes presented in
Section 2.
3.1 Classifiers
In this section, we present our classifiers and evaluate their preci-
sion and recall. In Section 4.2.1, we provide empirical evidence that
they are both needed.
3.1.1 Training & Evaluation Data Set. For the training and evalu-
ation of our classifiers we downloaded the newest versions of all
1,879 apps from F-Droid [20]. We chose F-Droid because it only
consists of open-source software. Hence, string obfuscation does
not make sense and is also not applied. This data set is used as
ground truth of plain strings and methods which do not contain
any deobfuscation logic. These two properties enable the obfus-
cation without dealing with the influence of previously existing
obfuscation artifacts. The standard configuration of the Android
build process might use name obfuscation due to the integration of
ProGuard. However, ProGuard does not use string obfuscation [44].
3.1.2 String Classifier. To train the classifier, we generated a data
set of 1,918,687 obfuscated from the same amount of non-obfuscated
strings. The set of non-obfuscated strings was extracted from the
F-Droid data set (cf. Section 3.1.1). We applied all 21 obfuscation
schemes identified in our case study (Section 2) to non-obfuscated
strings of F-Droid applications to obtain obfuscated strings. This
effort yields 32,379 obfuscated apps1 from which we extracted
all strings. As a result, we acquired significantly more obfuscated
strings than plain strings. To avoid a bias towards obfuscated strings,
we took all strings from the plain apps and randomly selected the
same number of strings from the obfuscated ones.
Approach. We extracted 49 different features from the collected
strings and trained a model using Weka’s REPTree. This enables
a fast comparison of the features by building a regression/deci-
sion tree using the most discriminatory features to check the most
relevant ones first. However, REPTree considers all these features
before it comes to a final decision for a given string. The authors
checked that the classifier considers all features for its final decision
by manually traversing the decision tree.
In the following, we describe the used features from Table 2
grouped by their category.
Format: In the study presented in Section 2, we observed that
obfuscated strings often contain non alphanumeric characters. Nev-
ertheless, we cannot classify a string as obfuscated just because
it contains non alphanumeric characters – plain strings of certain
formats may also use these characters. To avoid matching such
plain strings, we use various patterns to discern format usages
such as XML (e.g. </th>) and HTML colors (e.g. #FFAE40) in the
feature vector. These flags are used to give the model a hint that
the analyzed string might not be obfuscated. However, these hints
should not be confused with filtering, as they are only a part of the
classifier’s decision.
Statistical Tests: Previous statistical analyses of encryption mech-
anisms [27, 33, 43] show that obfuscated strings often have a ran-
dom (close to equal) distribution of characters. We use random
distribution as a discriminating feature to distinguish between ob-
fuscated and other strings with special characters. To checkwhether
the distribution of the characters in a string is random, we use three
different measures because each one is suited for different scenarios
we encountered. With the Chi-squared test, we measure the devia-
tion of the characters from the equal distribution of these characters,
since randomized characters are often equally distributed. With
the deviation from the average distribution, we measure whether
the given string belongs to a language or whether the characters
were only rotated (e.g. caesar cipher [27]). Normalized entropy was
previously [33] used to identify encrypted malware. We reuse it to
identify encrypted strings.
AndroDet: We use the number of equals, number of dashes, num-
ber of slashes, number of pluses, and the sum of repetitive characters
from the feature list of AndroDet [38] which are used to identify
if an app uses string obfuscation. However, AndroDet averages
these features over all strings in an app and is therefore not able to
classify individual strings.
Compression rate: Obfuscated strings may be confused with com-
pressed data, such as images compressed using JPEG and stored
in strings. To identify those strings, we compressed them and
1We were not able to obfuscate every app with every obfuscator due to version
incompatibilities between obfuscators and APKs to be obfuscated.
compared the resulting length against the original length; the re-
sulting length changes if the original content is not already com-
pressed [43].
Cryptographic libraries:Cryptographic libraries use byte-encoded
strings to initialize their algorithms, and this may cause false posi-
tives because they are similar to obfuscated strings. To avoid match-
ing such encoded strings, we check if a string usage is contained in
a known cryptographic library.
Dictionary words: The study in Section 2 revealed that obfuscated
strings contain only a few words or none at all. We use a dictionary
to check whether a string contains words or identifiers [19]. To
match words from foreign languages (e.g., Chinese) that do not use
separators such as white spaces, we apply Lucene’s ICUTokenizer
word splitting approaches. Furthermore, to match strings consisting
Table 2: Feature List for the Detection of Obfuscated Strings
Category Description
Format - User Agents
- URLs
- Character set of regular expressions
- Network protocols (e.g., WiFi)
- Common OS commands
- JSON format
- Encodings (e.g., UTF-8)
- E-Mail address
- DTD
- HTML Colors
- Class Path
- SQL Queries
- Keywords for seven programming languages
- Country names
- XML
- IP
- HTTP state
- Date
- Numeric
- Cryptographic primitives
- Mobile phone brands
- HTML special characters (e.g., uuml)
- String-encoded certificate
- String-encoded Android certificate
- Private/Public key
- String signatures of social network apps
- String-encoded images (e.g. JPEG)
Statistical Tests - Tests if all chars in the given string are equally,
distributed indicating a random distribution.
- The average distribution which is close to the
Gaussian distribution for plain strings,
- The normalized entropy of the strings,
AndroDet[38] - Number of equals
- Number of dashes
- Number of slashes
- Number of pluses
- Sum of repetitive characters
Compression Rate - The rate of the GZIP compression
Cryptography Library - The string is used in a known crypto library
Dictionary Words - The shortest word length
- The largest word length
- The number of words
- The number of unique words from a
multiple language dictionary
String Characteristics - Number of vocals
- Number of consonants
- Number of digits
- Number of characters
- Number of unique characters
- Number of non letters
- Maximum number of consecutive characters
- Maximum occurrences of the same character
of concatenated words (e.g. getLength), we use Samurai [19], which
splits identifiers by camel case and frequently used words.
String characteristics: Finally, we extract eight features related to
character distributions, e.g., character counts, digits.
Evaluation We use 80% of our data set for training and testing
and 20% for validation. To train and test the model, we use a 10-fold
cross-validation measure. Our validation data revealed a precision
of 98.79% and a recall of 89.75%. We identified two root causes for
false negatives. The first cause is that obfuscated strings accidentally
contain valid words (this is exacerbated by languages where a single
character can be a valid word, e.g. Chinese). The second, more
prevalent cause is obfuscated strings that consist of digits since
these frequently occur in plain text strings as well.
3.1.3 Classifier for Deobfuscation Methods. The string classifier
may miss obfuscated strings that are hidden in other data types, e.g.,
strings represented as byte arrays (cf. Table 1 BA). To address this
problem, we train a second classifier that identifies deobfuscation
methods. We use the identified methods from Section 2.
Approach. We postulate that deobfuscation methods use certain
instructions more often than ordinarymethods. This idea is inspired
by statistical analysis of English text, which, e.g., contains a high
number of the character ’e’ [43]. Likewise, deobfuscation methods
may use the XOR instructions more frequently than ordinary meth-
ods. To this end, we extract all instructions used in deobfuscation
methods of the identified schemes (cf. Section 2). The extraction of
the instructions is performed using the Structure-preserving Repre-
sentation (SPR) [22]. This representation preserves the structural
tokens of a method’s instructions but abstracts away information
that gets changed in obfuscated code and, thus, would produce
noise for the classification, e.g., all name and type information that
does not occur in the Android standard library is removed. We
compare the SPR-token distribution of our set of deobfuscation
methods with the ones found in apps using Spearman’s correlation
to identify similar methods. This comparison enables the method
classifier to handle obfuscation schemes that do not use string rep-
resentations (e.g. BAs) and identify not only exact matches of the
token distribution but also variations of it. Furthermore, we limit
our token extraction to those tokens occurring in known deobfus-
cation methods; as a result, our method classifier is also able to
identify in-lined deobfuscation logic.
Evaluation The primary purpose of the method classifier is
to locate deobfuscation schemes that represent obfuscated strings
in other data structures. As reported in Section 2, only two such
schemes exist (cf. BA in Table 1), and these also generate variations
of the deobfuscation logic. Nevertheless, to assess the precision
and recall of the method classifier, we use not only the schemes
which generate variations of known deobfuscation methods as a
ground truth but themethods of all the obfuscation tools acquired in
Section 2. We use methods generated by all tools since the method
classifier discriminates all kinds of deobfuscation methods, not only
those that handle other data structures than strings.
The two mentioned tools vary the logic of the deobfuscation
methods in different ways. First, they use random numbers as obfus-
cation keys. Second, they permute the order of formal parameters
or change the method’s signature. Third, they alter the position of
code blocks, whose execution order does not matter. Finally, deob-
fuscation methods may also depend on the context of string usages.
For instance, if a string is used only once in a class, one tool in-lines
the deobfuscation logic at the string usage site; in other cases, this
logic is extracted into a separate called method.
To measure the precision of the classifier and recall for each
variation, we applied the both obfuscators to the F-Droid data set
(cf. Section 3.1.1). We were able to generate 2,127 obfuscated apps,
at least 1,000 apps for each obfuscator 3. The deobfuscation methods
in the resulting obfuscated apps constitute our ground truth for
measuring recall and precision.
To extract them, we use information from the mapping files
produced by the obfuscator tools for each app. Mapping files enable
app developers to find the original names in the source code for
crash reports using obfuscated names. Consequently, methods and
fields with no entry in the mapping file must have been added by the
obfuscator. We add all new methods and also methods that access
newly added fields to the ground-truth list. The newly added fields
are used to identify in-lined deobfuscation logic, which resides in a
previously existing method.
Altogether, we obtain a list of 144,190 methods that contain
deobfuscation logic, either in a separate method or in-lined into
previously existing methods. The comparison of this list with the
method classifier’s output shows that it identifies the variants of
deobfuscation methods generated by the two subject obfuscator
tools with a precision of 99.66% and a recall of 97.42%. We conclude
that our classifier is very accurate, missing only a few deobfuscation
methods. A detailed analysis revealed that these methods have in-
lined obfuscation logic, but already used byte arrays before the
obfuscation. These previously existing byte arrays add noise to the
measured token distribution and weaken the correlation between
the method under analysis and our set of known deobfuscation
methods.
3.2 Slicing Relevant String Usages
A slicing criterion (scr it ) is any instruction within certain methods,
which we call candidate methods, that produces a string value.
A method m is in the set of candidate methods if (a) it contains
instructions that consume a char sequence as a parameter (method
calls, but also field writes, array stores, and return instructions),
called Locations of Interest (LoIs), and (b) satisfies one of following
conditions: (i) the string classifier found an obfuscated string in m,
(ii) m calls a method n, which the method classifier identified as a
deobfuscation method, or (iii) m is itself classified as a deobfuscation
method (in-lined deobfuscation logic).
Since the classifiers identify neither LoIs nor slicing criteria, we
have to search for them in the candidate methods.We use OPAL [18]
to find all instructions that operate on values of type CharSequence,
or a subtype thereof, in particular java.lang.String. All scr it are
expressions that result in strings which are afterward passed to
some LoI . Given a candidate method that contains LoIs, we identify
all scr it while ignoring constant string expressions.
3We were not able to obfuscate every app with every obfuscator due to version
incompatibilities between obfuscators and APKs to be obfuscated.
Our slicing algorithm performs backward slicing with forward-
phases to collect all instructions necessary for the execution of
other relevant instructions. For instance, if the slice contains a new
instruction, we also collect the corresponding constructor invoca-
tion. Additionally, if several potential sources for a given string
parameter are present, we start form each of them as separate
slicing criterion.
For example, Listing 1 shows two sources of msg (Line 2) cor-
responding to the two branches of the tertiary operator (Line 1),
which load either "US()" or "INT()". In such cases, StringHound
would start the slicing process for each source.
1 String msg = simCountryIso().equals("US") ? US() : INT();
2 invoke("+01234", msg);
Listing 1: Example with Two Sources
3.3 Our targeted Slicing
Our slicing technique (cf. Algorithm 1) is inspired by traditional
slicing algorithms (cf. Binkley et al. [6]), and implemented using
OPAL [18] with definitions (cf. Aho et al. [1]) of the functions
defined in Table 3.
Given a method along with its control-flow graph (CFG), a LoI
and a slicing criterion scr it , we initialize the worklistW (Line 2 of
Figure 1) with scr it . For each instruction inW (Line 6) that is not
already part of the slice (Line 8), we perform the following steps:
(1) We add the current instruction currInstr to the slice (Line 9).
Table 3: Definitions of Helper Functions for the Algorithm
def Instr → P(Var ) variables defined by an instruction
use Instr → P(Var ) variables used by an instruction
du Var × Instr → P(Instr ) definition-use instructions
ud Var × Instr → P(Instr ) use-definition instructions
cd Instr → P(Instr ) transitive control dependency instructions
br Instr → P(Instr ) set of backwards reachable instructions
Algorithm 1: Slicing Algorithm
Input: m a method with a body
I the instructions of the methodm
д the CFG ofm where each i ∈ I
corresponds to one node n ∈ N of д
LoI ∈ I the location of interest
scr it ∈ I the slicing criterion
Output: Nsl ice ⊆ I
1 Nsl ice := {}
2 W := {scr it }
3 cdcr it := cd (scr it )
4 brLoI := br (LoI )
5 whileW , ∅ do
6 curr Instr := head (W )
7 W :=W \ curr Instr
8 if currInstr < Nsl ice then
9 Nsl ice := Nsl ice ∪ { curr Instr }
10 D := {d | x ∈ use(curr Instr ) ∧ d ∈ ud(x, curr Instr )}
11 cdcurr Instr := cd (curr Instr ) \ cdcr it
12 U := {u | x ∈ def (curr Instr ) ∧ u ∈ du(x, curr Instr )
13 ∧ u ∈ brLoI }
14 W :=W ∪ D ∪ cdcurr Instr∪ U
15 end
16 end
CharSequence x = new ConstantCharSequence("C");
CharSequence sb = createMutableCharSequence();
if (conditionA){
sb.append(x);
} else {
 sb.append("D");
}
if (conditionB){
CharSequence s = sb.toString();
       sb.append("E");
useString(s,2);
}
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Figure 2: Example of the Slicing Process for the Parameter s
of useString—Showing LoIs and First Backward Phase
(2) In the backward phase (Line 10), we determine the set D of all
definition sites related to currInstr , i.e., D consists of instructions
that initialize variables used by currInstr .
(3) Also in the backward phase, we determine the set cdcurr Instr of
instructions on which the current instruction is control dependent
on (Line 11). From this set, we remove the instructions cdcr it that
could prevent the execution of scr it . This backward phase adds
instructions toW that (in)directly affect scr it . With this addition,
we include condition instructions that do not control the execution
of the criterion itself. This step is required to, e.g., ensure that loops
manipulating byte arrays are added to the slice. If the backward
phase adds instructions that define a new reference-typed variable,
i.e., an object, we perform an additional forward phase to include
those instructions inW that potentially affect the state of the object
after its initialization and which are relevant w.r.t. the LoI . Hence,
we only add instructions that are still backward reachable from the
LoI .
(4) In the forward phase (Line 12, 13), we determine the set of
all instructions U that use a variable defined by currInstr and
which are backward reachable from the LoI . This phase includes all
instructions that potentially mutate the state of the defined variable,
e.g., filling an array with actual values or calling a method of the
object.
(5) In the last step (Line 14), we updateW with the three differ-
ent sets of instructions. (i) cdcurr Instr the instructions on which
currInstr is control dependent,(ii) U those that use the variable
defined in currInstr , and (iii) D those that initialize the variables
used by currInstr .
The example in Figure 2 illustrates the process of determining
scr it and the backward phase of the algorithm, divided into 4 steps.
In step 0 we determine the statements that are candidates for LoIs.
Here, the constructor (Line 1), the append() calls (Lines 4, 6, and
10), and the call to useString() (Line 11) are selected. Given a LoI ,
we consider the definition sites (def-sites) of the instructions that
load the LoI ’s string parameters as slicing criteria (without includ-
ing the LoI itself). For illustration purposes, assume the LoI being
processed is the useString call (Line 11), the only string parameter
s (the int parameter is ignored) is defined by the result of the call
sb.toString() (Line 9); hence, this call is our slicing criterion. On
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CharSequence x = new ConstantCharSequence("C");
CharSequence sb = createMutableCharSequence();
if (conditionA){
sb.append(x);
} else {
 sb.append("D");
}
if (conditionB){
CharSequence s = sb.toString();
       sb.append("E");
useString(s,2);
}
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Figure 3: Example of the Slicing Process for the Parameter s
of useString — Showing the Necessary Forward Phase
the contrary, instructions that load string constants are not con-
sidered as slicing criteria, e.g., Line 6 is a LoI , but the instruction
that loads the string constant "D" is not a slicing criterion. The
rationale is that in such cases, we are sure that no deobfuscation
happens before reaching the LoI . In Figure 2 such LoIs are pointed
at by dashed arrows. Therefore, we establish in step 1 that the call
useString(s,2) (Line 11) is the LoI and toString() (Line 9) is
the scr it . The first backward slicing phase determines the definition
site of the object on which toString() is called, i.e., sb, this is step
2. Hence, createMutableCharSequence (Line 2) is added to the
slice in step 3. The if-condition (Line 8) is not added to the slice
because it would potentially prevent the execution of the slicing
criterion (scr it ).
The example continues in Figure 3, showing the forward phase
of the algorithm. Here, we perform a forward phase concerning
createMutableCharSequence (Line 2) which does not use vari-
ables. Thus, no backward step is necessary. In step 4 (cf. Figure 3)
we identify all use-sites of sb and, since all of them (Lines 4, 6,
9, and 10) are backward reachable from the LoI , we add them to
the slice. In this case, Line 10 is not needed in the slice, because
the string returned at Line 9 cannot be mutated afterwards. How-
ever, our algorithm does not have such knowledge and, therefore,
conservatively adds it. Next, in step 5(a) the algorithm processes
the append calls in Lines 4 and 6 as follows. Given that no local
variable is defined, there will not be a forward step; however, in the
first append call (Line 4), we use x and, therefore, add the defining
instruction (Line 1) to the slice. Additionally, the if-instruction
in Line 3 is added to the slice, because both appends are control
dependent on it, but not scr it . When we process the append call
in Line 10 in step 5(b) we see that the if-condition (Line 8) would
possibly prevent the execution of scr it and thus do not add it.
Step 6 is not explicitly shown, as it basically repeats steps 2-5
but starts with the variable x in Line 4.
To recap, the resulting slice is the entire code from Figure 3,
except for Lines 8 and 11 in Figure 3 (which are crossed out). In
contrast to our approach, traditional slicing algorithms would in-
clude the condition in Line 8 into the slice which could prevent the
execution of the relevant code.
In step 7, we create the executable code, including a method
to retrieve the value that would have been used at the LoI . The
following section explains this in more detail.
3.4 Executing Sliced String Usages
To obtain the deobfuscated string that in the original application
would flow into the LoI , we extend the slice by a call to a method
that logs the string. This call effectively replaces the original LoI
with the call to the logging method, which allows us to retrieve
the deobfuscated string value. We add a return statement to the
slice to ensure that the signature of the sliced method can remain
as before. If we need to return a value, we either return null or the
numeric value 0—depending on the declared return type. Next, we
replace the body of the original candidate method with the extended
slice; this ensures that the execution context w.r.t. the name of the
declaring class as well as the name and signature of the method is
identical to the original code to evade the countermeasures SC and
KSC.
To execute the sliced method in its context, we have to make the
class concrete, if it is abstract. Therefore, all abstract methods are
made concrete by returning default values of the declared return
type. We rewrite the class so that it extends a superclass that we
generate, including the corresponding static initializer and super
calls.With this step, we increase the likelihood that the initialization
of our class containing the sliced method does not abort with an
exception to evade the countermeasures SI and OI. Recall that we
have no means to determine appropriate parameter values that
we could use and, therefore, always have to use default values.
The generated superclass also implements all methods transitively
called by the sliced method. As previously, we return default values
if required.
We set up the classpath to include all classes of the original
application, except the modified one. Additionally, we add the new
class as well as our new superclass to ensure that our slice can
find any application class used in its code. As a replacement of the
original android.jar, we use an artificial jar with methods stubs.
Methods that have to return a value return the type’s default value
(e.g., null or 0). All these transformations together, in combination
with our slicing approach, enable StringHound to circumvent all
obfuscation schemes discussed in Table 1. Even if reflection is used,
the slice can be run successfully as long as the targets are part of
the execution environment. Native methods are not included, since
most Android applications do not compile their native parts for the
x86 architecture on which we perform the slicing.
Finally, we call the resulting method reflectively using default
values for the parameters when necessary. The method will then
call our logging method to record the deobfuscated string.4 If the
execution of the sliced method crashes, no other slices are affected
and only the result of the crashed slice will be missing. We chose
to call the sliced methods with default values because the choice of
them is simple and caused no overhead. Nevertheless, our approach
does not depend on this choice and can be extended to support
more advanced methods for determining the parameter values such
as fuzzing.
4We can specify a time limit for the slice execution, to cancel long-running slices.
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4 EVALUATION
We performed two studies (a) comparing StringHound against
other string deobfuscators, and (b) assessing the performance of
StringHound on real-world apps.
The setup consists of a Server with two AMD(R) EPYC(R) 7542
@ 2.90 GHz (32 cores / 64 threads each) CPU, and 512 GB RAM. The
analyses were run using OpenJDK 1.8_212 64-bit VM with 20 GB
of heap memory, and a 5s timeout for a single string deobfuscation.
4.1 Comparison with Other Deobfuscators
We evaluated StringHound against Dex-Oracle 1.0.5 [14], Simplify
1.2.1 [49], JMD 1.61 [26], and DEX2JAR 2.0 [15]. To the best of our
knowledge, these are the only freely available deobfuscators.
As input for the deobfuscators, we randomly picked 1,000 apps
from the data set described in Section 3.1.2 which have not been
previously used to train our classifiers. Two comparison metrics
are used: (a) percentage of APKs processed without termination
errors; and (b) recall, which we define as the percentage of unique
deobfuscated strings over all unique strings in the original apps.
The precision metric is discarded since our data set contained only
obfuscated strings. Therefore, there cannot be false positives (i.e.,
plain strings identified as obfuscated). However, StringHound’s
false positive rate is restricted by the false positives produced by
the string classifier and the method classifier. The results are sum-
marized in Figure 4. In the following, we discuss each deobfuscator
individually.
Simplify [49] applies semantic-preserving transformations to re-
engineer the APK’s code, such as constant propagation and dead
code removal. To enable transformations, it executes each method
on a custom Dalvik virtual machine and returns a graph with all
possible register and class values for every execution path. Simplify
can be used as a deobfuscator in limited cases [49], namely for
deobfuscationmethods that do not depend on any state and use only
constants. In such cases, constant propagation can uncover hidden
information. Additionally, Simplify optimizes all statements also the
ones which are not relevant to deobfuscate a string. Unfortunately,
Simplify’s re-engineered APKs were completely broken and could
not be analyzed to produce results; hence, Figure 4 reports 0% for
both values.
DEX2JAR [15] transforms Dalvik bytecode to Java bytecode. It
has a sub-module that executes methods with a certain signature
for deobfuscation purposes. Similar to our approach, it executes the
code in the JVM. Unlike StringHound, DEX2JAR needs the user to
provide the deobfuscation method to be executed. We applied our
deobfuscation method classifier to each app and used its output as
input for DEX2JAR. Providing the same deobfuscation methods as
input to DEX2JAR and StringHound enables a fair comparison of the
two. However, DEX2JAR processed only 30% of the APKs without
errors, and it was unable to deobfuscate a single string, resulting in
a 0% recall. This weak results in our empirical study are caused by
DEX2JAR’s assumption that deobfuscation methods are in the same
class as the obfuscated string. Moreover, DEX2JAR assumes that
all constant values needed for the execution of the deobfuscation
method are provided before it is called, while the latter can also be
the result of other accesses or computations. Unfortunately, none of
the obfuscation techniques that we surveyed in Section 2 matches
these conditions.
JMD [26] re-implements deobfuscation logic of known obfusca-
tors [12, 41, 62] to execute it with directly-propagated constants.
These constants are extracted from previously identified immedi-
ate callers of known deobfuscation methods. After the execution
of the deobfuscation logic, the calls to this logic is replaced with
the revealed strings. Unlike our approach, JMD does not consider
field accesses or other ways to retrieve the propagated values. It
identifies obfuscated strings by searching for a specific loading-
instruction (LDC). Therefore, it misses almost all obfuscated strings,
which would be produced by the techniques from Section 2 because
they are loaded by a different instruction (LDC_W). Additionally,
JMD uses a fixed set of method signatures without considering vari-
ations or in-lining of deobfuscation logic. Finally, the deobfuscation
logic uses a constant key, but as shown in Section 3.1.3, the key
varies with each string usage. JMD’s limitations lead to its poor
performance: while successfully processing 94% of the APKs, only
0.01% of the strings were deobfuscated.
Dex-Oracle [14] searches for deobfuscationmethods and executes
them in an emulator. It uses fixed method signatures to search the
app code. Therefore, it misses variations of methods produced the
same obfuscator and in-lined deobfuscation code. For instance, only
two kinds of signatures for deobfuscation methods are processed.
Whereas, one has only a String parameter, the other takes three
int parameters. Both signatures return a String. However, some
obfuscators use methods with more than three parameters, which
may also have other types than String or int and return Object
instead of String. Moreover, it has similar drawbacks as Simplify
and JMD–wherein is it required that the inputs of the deobfuscation
method call are instructions that return a constant value.
As Figure 4 shows, Dex-Oracle processed all APKs without errors
but recovered only 2.5% of all obfuscated strings. Its strict assump-
tions match only very few deobfuscation methods found in the wild,
leading to a low recall. Even those are only a coincidence because
the obfuscator, which produced these deobfuscation methods, has
various other templates (cf. Section 3.1.3) as also shown in Table 1
with cn.pro.sdk.
StringHound was able to process all APKs with a recall of 73.9%.
A detailed analysis of the 26.1% missing cases showed that every
obfuscation scheme listed in Table 1 occurred in the false negative
set. Furthermore, the analysis revealed that either the execution
environment, surrounding the sliced method, is too complex to be
modeled with our default values (cf. Section 5) or the classifiers
were not able to identify the obfuscated strings (cf. Section 3.1.3).
However, the high recall confirms the effectiveness of our approach,
which does not suffer from the various limitations of the state-of-
the-art deobfuscators. Unlike our approach, other deobfuscators do
not ’automatically’ identify obfuscated strings and deobfuscation
methods. To use them, one either needs to know the deobfuscation
methods beforehand or must run all methods of the app being
analyzed. Such a brute-force approach does not scale to large data
sets.
4.2 Findings in the Wild
In this section, we use StringHound to assess how often string
obfuscation is used in the wild and for what purposes. Four different
sets of APKs are used for our study. The first set consists of 100,000
apps from AndroidZoo [25]. The second set consists of the Top
500 most common apps based on AndroidRank [2]. The third set
consists of apps that were available on the Play Store in 2018 and
were classified as malicious by at least 10 AV vendors in VirusTotal.
Finally, the last set consists of 230 Android malware samples from
Contagio [9], containing current and past malware families.
4.2.1 Prevalence of Obfuscated Strings in the Wild. In this section,
we measure the prevalence of obfuscated strings in the wild. There-
fore, we apply our approach to 100,000 apps from Section 2. To
avoid false positives, we exclude all constant strings from our find-
ings and count the remaining ones, which we refer to as newly
revealed strings.
Next, we calculated the number of APKs containing newly re-
vealed strings. Based on our study in Section 2, we discovered that
only parts of the strings are obfuscated, and some obfuscators hide
obfuscated strings in other data structures.
Observation 2. Our results invalidate the claims of pre-
vious studies [17, 38, 56] that less than 5% of the apps contain
obfuscated strings, because we discovered that 76% of the 100,000
apps contain obfuscated strings.
During our analysis, we also measured the proportion of newly
revealed strings which were found by the different classifiers. The
results indicate that the string classifier detected 28%, and the
method classifier 77% of the newly revealed strings.
Observation 3. These findings provide empirical evidence
that both classifiers are needed because they have only an over-
lap of 5% for newly revealed strings. The method classifier iden-
tifies most of the newly revealed strings. However, the string
classifier provides at least 23% of newly revealed strings and,
thus, it is also necessary to achieve a higher total recall.
4.2.2 Categorization of String Obfuscation. To understand the us-
age of string obfuscation in the wild, we used regular expressions
to categorize all deobfuscated strings in different classes. Alto-
gether, we defined the regular expressions in Table 4 for matching
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Figure 5: Categories of String Obfuscation in the 100k Apps.
Table 4: Regular Expressions for the Evaluation of Deobfus-
cated Strings in the Wild.
Name Regex
URL \w+://[^/\"]+.*
IP .*\b([0-9]{1,3}\.){3}[0-9]{1,3}\b.*
Paths /\w+[\./].+
Intents android.intent\..*
SQL .*(select.*from | update.*set | insert into |
delete from | create table | drop table |
truncate table).*
Certificates MII.+
Permissions android.permission\..*
YouTube API Key [36] AIza[0-9A-Za-z\-_]{35}
Cryptography algorithms MD2|MD5|SHA\-?1|ECB|DES
URLs, file system paths (Paths), IPs, intents, SQL statements (SQL),
permissions (Perms), certificates (Certs), cryptography algorithms
(crypto), credentials, system services (Services), commands, and API
keys[36]. Our regex for URLs is not limited to the typical HTTP(S)
form but also matches any scheme, such as content and file URLs.
Furthermore, a pattern for IPs is used to match non-URL related
communication. The third regex matches absolute directories as
well as paths pointing to data or executable files. Intents and per-
missions are identified via a regex based on Android’s standard
definitions. The regular expression for SQL statements matches
strings with common keywords for querying and manipulating
tables. Finally, certificates are identified by the Base64 encoded first
three characters, which are used as a prefix for certificates.
We applied the regular expressions to all deobfuscated strings
in our data sets (discarding apps without newly revealed strings).
Afterward, we counted their matches to quantify the prevalence of
each kind of usage.
Figure 5 shows a categorization of the resulting deobfuscated
strings in the 100,000 apps. The bar chart is divided into critical
and benign apps with obfuscated strings. We identified many crit-
ical strings that we found by counting the following facts. First,
we identified more HTTP requests than HTTPS for which lead to
security issues [53]. Second, developers request permissions but
are not aware that these permissions are also used via obfuscated
strings by ad libraries to access private data. Third, insecure cryp-
tography algorithms such as DES, AES with ECB mode, or MD2
are still used in obfuscated strings. Fourth, credentials, hidden in
obfuscated strings, are sent via HTTP GET method to login to their
services. Fifth, services, requested in obfuscated strings, provide
dangerous accesses (e.g., the location of the device). Sixth, rooted
phones execute commands, hidden in obfuscated strings, to grant
root access. Last, YouTube API keys, hidden in obfuscated strings,
can be used to consume the developer’s API quotas.
Observation 4. Using StringHound our analysis of the
100,000 apps reveals that critical usages of URLs, piggy-backed
permissions, insecure cryptography algorithms, hard-coded cre-
dentials, dangerous services, root commands, and API keys are
hidden in obfuscated strings.
4.2.3 Context Analysis of the Categories. While the 100,000 apps
contain a large variety of statistical findings, we have no insights
into apps that belong to the extreme fields in the Android ecosystem.
Therefore, we chose three different data sets to get an understanding
of these kinds of fields and the context of StringHound’s findings.
These data sets consist of the top 500 most installed apps in the
Play store, and two malware sets to analyze current (malware 2018)
and past (Contagio) obfuscated malware. Figure 6 shows a catego-
rization of the resulting deobfuscated strings. Each bar corresponds
to the percentage of APKs from a data set containing at least one
deobfuscated string in the given category. Therefore, each category
comprises a group of three bars, where each corresponds to one
data set.
The first bar shows that 60% of the Contagio malware obfus-
cates strings, mostly paths (40%), URLs (12%), or intents (5%). A
detailed analysis revealed absolute paths of commands trying to
open a command shell or of further APK or DEX files hidden in
the resources of the app containing the malware’s actual payload.
One path was used to establish a connection to a Command &
Control server (AnserverBot [23]). Furthermore, we found paths
to files on the SD card and to DHCP settings, which are exploited
by the DroidKungFu2 malware [28]. Our regex for URLs matched
locations of browser settings that can be used to build a profile of
the underlying mobile phone - some URLs linked to services pro-
viding the geolocation of the accessing IP address. We also found
URLs to ad networks that profile the user’s phone. The regular
expression for intents matched an action that resets the default
page of the browser to either show pages of ad networks or to track
user’s behavior. Furthermore, the intent regex discovered an action,
which queries the phone number of the mobile phone to reveal the
identity of the user. Finally, we also found an action that performs
phone calls.
In the malware set from 2018, 35% of APKs use string obfusca-
tion to hide a variety of interactions with the Android operating
system. We matched URLs that lead to ad networks, which track
the user’s interactions and build profiles of users as well as URLs
that access the user’s calendar and can reveal detailed information
of their schedules. The tracking of interactions, in combination
with profiling, violates the user’s privacy. We also found hidden
paths of an APK holding its malicious payload. Moreover, paths to
operating-system commands, which access hardware and sensor
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Figure 6: Categories of String Obfuscation in the Wild.
data to profile a phone, were revealed. Findings regarding intents
and permissions indicate that malware uses intents to access func-
tionality to call or send SMS to premium numbers. Additionally,
the malware tries to locate or profile a user by accessing personal
calendars, accounts, or states of a phone. In comparison to malware
from the Contagio set, more recent malware focuses on leakages of
private data, causing financial damage to the unknowing user.
Observation 5. Current malware in the Play store makes
less use of string obfuscation (35% compared to 60%) and focuses
more on hiding leakages of private data. Without StringHound,
one would miss information that is essential to detect remote
command execution, even causing financial damage to the user,
and leakages of private data in at least 35% of recent malware.
Surprisingly, string obfuscation is more frequently used in the
Top 500 apps than in the 100,000-set of apps (89% vs. 76%), even
more frequently than in malware. Our evaluation shows that 33%
of the apps use obfuscated URLs. Some of those URLs are used to
track users’ IDs and IP through an ad network.
These actions directly violate users’ privacy. A detailed review
of the findings showed that all ad libraries contain obfuscated URLs
and paths. We also analyzed how many apps use string obfuscation
only in ad- and third-party libraries5. This analysis revealed that
63.52% of all obfuscated strings in the Top 500 data set are contained
in ad libraries, an additional 10.64% are contained in other libraries,
and the remaining 25.84% are in the app itself.
Observation 6. String obfuscation is frequently used in all
sorts of apps. Ad libraries are responsible for over 63% of these
strings. This result is alarming since neither the user nor the
developer of the app is aware of the added functionality. With
StringHound the developer could check the content of the used
ad library and choose an appropriate alternative.
Two games for children contained obfuscated privacy violations
in the Top 500 data set. We manually analyzed their code and
found that they collect and transmit sensitive information on the
5To this end, we filtered our findings by the list of ad-library package names from
Section 2 and by a list of common libraries [30].
user’s mobile phone. The leaked information includes build, connec-
tivity, debug, runtime, telephony, Android version, and hardware
data, which can be used to build a user profile. Code related to
data collection is hidden in a stealthy package mixed into the inte-
grated Android support library. The app additionally checks for the
SuperUser.apk, a package that grants root access to the mobile
phone. We reported both apps to the app store, since according to
AndroidRank [2], these suspicious apps are installed on at least 20
million devices.
Observation 7. Virus scanners do not flag suspicious pri-
vacy violations. Since, we uploaded the two apps to VirusTo-
tal [55], which showed no findings, besides the usage of danger-
ous permissions. StringHound allows the analyst to search for
all kinds of violations.
5 DISCUSSION
There are a few limitations of StringHound that will be subject of
further consideration in future work.
Driven by the study of obfuscation schemes, StringHound uses
intra-procedural slicing to recover automatically obfuscated strings.
As a result, the slice’s execution may fail if it expects values, which
differ from our injected defaults. However, this limitation can be ad-
dressed by fuzzing the expected values. Given a field or parameter,
fuzzing guesses their values by their data-dependencies or using
symbolic execution to discover possible value ranges. If a decryp-
tion key is not present in the app code, e.g. because it is downloaded
over a network only under very specific circumstances, we cannot
deobfuscate strings that are encrypted with it. Obfuscators can
use fields and parameters to perform inter-procedural obfuscation.
However, to perform it automatically, they need to identify the
call order of the fields and parameters. This call-order is not easily
identifiable because of the limitation of current call graph analyses
for Android. Of course, making StringHound inter-procedural is
an obvious alternative, but coping with potential inter-procedural
obfuscation schemes is a trade-off between soundness and perfor-
mance.
Further challenges for StringHound are the dynamic usage of
external packages, encrypted classes, and native code. While these
techniques would evade our approach, the combination of other
tools [29] with StringHound can mitigate these challenges.
If an obfuscator adds random dictionary words to a string, it
can eventually evade detection by our String classifier because
the proportion of content that is classified as non-obfuscated will
increase. However, for this technique to be effective, more than half
of a given string would need to consist of non-obfuscated words.
During our analysis of obfuscation techniques, we never found
more than one dictionary word in obfuscated strings.
Finally, if a new obfuscation technique for strings is used that
does not share any commonalities with known techniques, we need
to extend the approach with the found technique without training
from scratch, as we can train additional REPTrees, and consider a
string as obfuscated, as long as at least one REPTree classifies it as
such. Similarly we can add the SPR representation of a different
technique to the list of known obfuscation techniques to adapt the
method classification.
6 RELATEDWORK
In this section, we discuss four approaches, which could poten-
tially be used for deobfuscation, and studies on the usage of string
obfuscation in the wild.
6.1 Potential Deobfuscation Approaches
While different slicing approaches [7, 10, 24, 37] exist that could
be modified with much effort to deobfuscate strings; others can be
used almost directly. Unfortunately, we could not include the other
works [5, 46, 61, 64] in our empirical evaluation because they were
not publicly available. We contacted all authors via e-mail, how-
ever, without any responses. Additionally, the re-implementation
of their tools was also not possible because some parts cannot be
reconstructed from the papers. As a result, we only discuss these
approaches in the following based on their descriptions.
Harvester [46], TIRO [61], CredMiner [64], and ARES [5] combine
static and dynamic analysis to extract obfuscated runtime values,
including obfuscated strings, from Android malware. All these
approaches execute re-bundled code on an emulator using monkey
scripts. This re-bundled code is sliced, starting from a fixed set of
starting points.
On the contrary, StringHound requires neither re-bundling the
app nor an emulator setup that explores all paths with a monkey
script. As a result, StringHound can analyze Android and Java ap-
plications without searching for the correct combination of events
to trigger the deobfuscation. Additionally, our classifiers identify
more than a fixed set of starting points.
6.2 Identifying Obfuscated Apps
Several approaches have been proposed to identify whether the con-
tent of an (Android) app is changed by an obfuscator [17, 38, 56, 58].
While OBFUSCAN [58] only identifies name obfuscations, the other
three approaches [17, 38, 56] can identify whether the code contains
obfuscated strings. Wang et al. [56] even infer the used obfuscator.
Like our classifiers, all four approaches rely on machine learning
techniques to identify whether code is obfuscated or not. How-
ever, unlike our approach, they can only detect string obfuscation
if all strings in the app are obfuscated. Additionally, they cannot
handle obfuscated strings which are represented by byte arrays.
We use the token distribution [22] with the Spearman’s correla-
tion to perform a scalable and lightweight similarity measurement.
Other approaches, such as those used in clone detection [31], are
not suited for obfuscated clones and would require a considerable
ground truth for the training of their neuronal networks.
7 CONCLUSION & FUTUREWORK
This paper shows how and why string obfuscation is used in real-
world Android and Java apps. We presented StringHound, our ap-
proach to identify obfuscated strings and recover their plain text.
StringHound significantly improves over state-of-the-art deobfus-
cation tools. We also presented a large-scale study on the usage of
string obfuscation in benign and malicious apps, revealing highly-
relevant findings.
We provide empirical evidence that string obfuscation is com-
monly used across malware, 100,000 apps from Google’s Play Store,
and various ad libraries. This evidence invalidates statements by
previous research, suggesting that string obfuscation is rarely used
in practice. By undoing string obfuscation, we revealed abundant
problematic string usages in the wild: Critical internet accesses,
piggy-backed permissions, insecure usage of cryptography algo-
rithms, hard-coded passwords, and available YouTube API keys.
We have found not only malware concealing hidden commands
and communication endpoints, but also spyware-like behavior in
two apps in the Top 500 set. Our studies have shown that libraries
account for a significant amount of obfuscated strings in benign
apps. Many findings in the ad libraries reveal serious privacy issues.
We have already mentioned several interesting areas for future
work in Section 5. In addition, we will investigate ways to improve
StringHound’s runtime performance by incorporating library de-
tection [4, 22, 32, 34, 57] and extraction and/or by parallel execution
of slices.
AVAILABILITY
StringHound and all data sets that we used as a foundation for
our evaluation are freely available at: https://github.com/stg-tud/
StringHound.
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A APPENDIX
In this section, we describe the runtime performance of StringHound.
A.1 Runtime Performance
To evaluate the runtime performance of StringHound, we mea-
sured the average runtime per APK and per slice, when running
StringHound on the Top 500, and the two data sets from Section
4.2. While the first measure shows how long our approach needs
for APKs of different sizes, the second one can be used to approxi-
mate the analysis time for a given APK. All performance measures
indicate that StringHound is fast and ready for practical use.
Figure 7 shows the average runtime per APK. Thereby, each
bar corresponds to one data set and is split into the time needed
(a) for loading the analysis, (b) executing the String Classifier, (c)
executing the Method Classifier, and (d) building and executing
slices. One can see, processing the Top 500 data set needs up to
20 times more on average per APK than processing the Contagio
data set. The reason for this high discrepancy is a large amount of
library code in the APKs of the Top 500 data set. As mentioned in
Section 4.2, 74.16% of the obfuscated strings are found in libraries,
and these are up to 14 times larger in code size than APKs from
the Contagio data set. The time taken to analyze such apps can
be reduced by employing tools that separately analyze the library
code and reuse these analysis results. Another observation is that
across all three data sets, slicing consumes most of the execution
time. Hence, improving the performance of the slicing would speed
up the entire analysis.
We calculated the mean, median, and also the 95%-quantile for
each slice of all three data sets, and all of them are below 250 ms.
Thus, we conclude that building and executing a single slice takes
on average less than 250ms. Given the observation that slicing
consumes most of the execution time and also the execution of a
single slice takes less than 250 ms, the only improvement to speed
up the performance is to parallelize the building and execution of
single slices.
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